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OMNISCIENCE, IMMUTABILITY, AND 
THE DIVINE MODE OF KNOWING 
Thomas D. Sullivan* 
Recent attacks on the classical doctrine that God is both omniscient and 
immutable reason that God's knowledge of temporal events must be ade-
quately expressible in indexical or nonindexical propositions, and that, on 
either account, the doctrine is incoherent. I argue that this is a false dilemma, 
that Aquinas exposed it as such, and that he offered a solution to the problem 
seldom considered by either proponents or opponents of the classical theory. 
I then defend Aquinas' neglected proposal. 
1. The Problem 
There was a time when it was widely held that God, perfect in all ways, 
was beyond change. Indeed, change did not even exist until God created the 
world. By his thought and loving action, God thereafter transformed the 
world, not himself. In our time, however, a new orthodoxy has replaced the 
old. Many philosophers and theologians now teach that the notion that God 
stands stiff and immutable above time and the flux of things is a wayward 
idea of the Greeks, at variance with scripture and radically incoherent. l In an 
influential essay a few years back, Norman Kretzmann set out the following 
argument, widely adopted by proponents of the new position.2 
(1) A perfect being is not subject to change. 
(2) A perfect being knows everything. 
(3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is. 
(4) A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change. 
Therefore: 
(5) A perfect being is subject to change. 
Therefore: 
(6) A perfect being is not a perfect being. 
Finally, therefore, 
(7) There is no perfect being. 
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There have been a number of recent replies to the Argument from Omni-
science, one by Kretzmann himself.3 Rather oddly, however, though writers 
on both sides of the debate often take Aquinas as representative of the clas-
sical position, few consider the remarkable proposal at the heart of Thomas's 
solution.4 My main purpose here is to draw attention to this proposal, which 
seems to me to light up an entire range of questions about the operation of 
the divine mind. 
Before turning to Aquinas it will be useful to review briefly a common 
response to the Argument from Omniscience. That response, often taken to 
be Aquinas' own, fails. But Aquinas' solution, I will argue, is left untouched 
by the Argument from Omniscience. 
2. A Standard Reply to the Argument from Omniscience 
What can a defender of the classical view say in response to the Argument 
from Omniscience? The defender's first choice might be to deny proposition 
(4). Propositions (1) and (2) are classical assumptions. Proposition (3)-A 
being that knows everything always know what time it is-seems obvious. 
But proposition (4) looks entirely gratuitous. Why should anyone think that 
a being that always knows what time it is is subject to change? 
Proposition (4), however, is not a gratuitous assumption. A very strong 
argument can be made for it.5 If I know, say, that it is now noon, I do not 
now know that it is one o'clock. To know that it is one o'clock, I must wait 
an hour. Then, however, I will no longer know it is noon. But to know one 
thing at one time and not to know it at another is to change. So, more 
generally, 
(A) Necessarily, a being that always knows what time it is [now] knows 
different things at different times. 
(B) Necessarily, a being that knows different things at different times 
changes. 
It seems, then, that a being that always knows what time it is now is indeed 
subject to change. 
Perhaps, then, we have moved too quickly past (3), the claim that a being 
that knows everything always knows what time it is. For on the traditional 
view, God is not only immutable, but timeless. He does not know one thing 
at one time and another at another time, but everything in an eternal present. 
A classical theorist should reject (3) unless it is restricted to timebound 
beings. With this restriction, however, it fails to mesh with (4). 
Let's take a closer look at this point. To say that a being that knows 
everything always knows what time it is, could mean either 
(3a) Throughout all time the (timebound) being knows what time it is. 
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or 
(3b) Throughout all its (timeless) existence, the being knows what time it is 
quoad nos, i.e., what time it is for those whose existence is temporal. 
The classical theorist accepts (3) only in the sense of (3b). God "always" 
knows what time it is in a timeless sense of "always." But, proposition (4) is 
true only if "always" is taken temporally. Thus there is no genuine connection 
between (3) and (4). The Argument from Omniscience trades on an ambiguity. 
3. The Inadequacy of the Standard Response 
But does the rejoinder by the classical theorist really solve the problem? 
Many think it does not. Arthur Prior observes "it seems an extraordinary way 
of affirming God's omniscience if a person, when asked what God knows 
now, must say "Nothing," and when asked what he knew yesterday, must 
again say "Nothing," and must yet again say "Nothing" when asked what 
God will know tomorrow. "6 
Prior's taunt, however, should not disturb a defender of the classical theory. 
Of course it looks like an "an extraordinary way of affirming God's omni-
science" if all you focus on are the denials. But the defender of God's atempo-
ral omniscience affirms as well as denies. The defender affirms divine 
omniscience while denying imperfections. One might as well say that it is an 
extraordinary way of affirming God's power if a person, when asked what 
God can lift with his right arm, must say "Nothing," and with his left, "Noth-
ing," and with his teeth, "Nothing." By so answering no one is trying to affirm 
anything, but only trying to deny absurd anthropomorphisms. It would be an 
extraordinary way to affirm God's infinite intelligence by denying God has 
the brains of a rabbit. But what should one say? God does have the brains of 
a rabbit? 
A much deeper difficulty, however, confronts the classical position. There 
seems to be no proper answer to the question: What, precisely, does God 
know "throughout eternity" when he knows temporal events? Suppose it is 
now the twelfth of May. Does God know that it is now the twelfth of May? 
If so that knowledge would seem to locate God's awareness, and thus God 
Himself, in a time frame. For knowing that today is the twelfth of May entails 
knowing one's temporal position. And it follows from knowing one's tem-
poral position that one has a temporal position. Thus it is a necessary condi-
tion of knowing it is now the twelfth of May that one have a temporal 
position.7 
To avoid this, some note that we may know and represent the same facts 
in different ways. Jill can know that Jack has a toothache, without knowing 
it in the same way Jack does. Jack thinks: I have a toothache. Jill thinks: He 
has a toothache. Similarly a timeless being could know what Jack knows 
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when Jack thinks It is now the twelfth of May, but represent the fact in a 
somewhat different way. A timeless being could have recourse to eternal 
statements expressing only a certain order among events. For example, the 
being could say that the twelfth of May of a given year is so many days after 
the birth of Christ. 8 
This, however, will not do. Kretzmann exhibits the futility of such a reply 
with a striking piece of parallel reasoning. The knowledge of contingent 
events attributed to God on this account would be like the knowledge you 
would have of a movie you had written, directed, acted in, and seen many 
times. You would know every scene in complete detail and you would know 
the sequence of scenes, and if there were a visible clock in every scene, you 
would also know the time of every scene. But if the film were now showing 
in a distinct theatre, the patrons would have one big advantage over you. 
They, but not you, would know what was on the screen now. An omniscient 
being must not only know the entire scheme of temporal events, but as 
Kretzmann notes, at what stage of realization that scheme now is.9 You might 
know that Annushka spills the sunflower oil before Berlioz slips on it and 
slides down the slope leading to the streetcar rails. But you would not know 
whether the screen shows Annushka spilling the oil or Berlioz sliding to his 
death. 
A defender of the classical theory, therefore, cannot counter the Argument 
from Omniscience just by insisting that God stands outside of time. For the 
defender still must say what it is that God knows. To say that what he knows 
is just the temporal sequence is to deprive God of the knowledge of what is 
happening at any particular momenL 10 This is tantamount to giving up the 
claim (2) that a perfect being knows everything. 
The difficulty for the classical theory, then, is this. Suppose proposition 
(3)-A being that knows everything always knows what time it is-is under-
stood in such a way as to place the being in time. Then it connects with 
(4)-A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change-and 
there is no equivocation. The Argument from Omniscience goes through. 
Suppose, on the other hand, "always" in (3) is understood to mean eternally. 
Then (2) turns out false; there will be much that a perfect being will not know, 
namely, what is going on as it is going on. Either way, then, the classical 
position appears incoherent. 
4. Aquinas' Proposal 
With these difficulties in mind, let us tum now to Aquinas' proposal. 
Thomas takes up the problem immediately after arguing that God's knowl-
edge must be immutable since his knowledge is identical with his immutable 
substance. ll The objection-our objection-is that God's knowledge can 
scarcely be immutable if it is to include temporal events. After all, 
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God knew Christ would be born. But now he does not know that Christ will 
be born, because it is not now the case that Christ will be born. Therefore it 
is not the case that whatever God knew he knows. And so, it seems, God's 
knowledge must be variable. 12 
Before giving his solution Aquinas considers a variation on the contemporary 
reply-eternalizing the proposition that God knows-only to reject it. He 
then makes his own proposal: 
It must therefore be conceded that this assertion "Whatever God knew he 
knows," is not true if the reference is to statable things (si ad enuntiabilia 
referatur). But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God 
is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God 
knows one and the same thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, so it 
is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows something 
statable (scit aliquod enuntiabile) to be true at some time, and false at another. 
The knowledge of God, however, would be variable ifhe knew statable things 
in the mode of the statable, by composing and dividing, as happens in our 
intellect (si enuntiabilia cognosce ret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo 
et dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro ).13 
It is not obvious how this reply is supposed to solve the problem. Why should 
it matter whether God knows by composing and dividing or in a simpler way? 
This seems irrelevant. For whether God must perform several acts or only 
one to arrive at what we arrive at, we still must ask the same question about 
the result, about what is grasped in divine thought. What is it that he knows? 
If we say God knows what we know, that he knows what is happening now 
or will happen or has happened, albeit by a simpler act than our own, it 
remains that God is mutable. If, on the other hand, we deny that he knows 
what we know, then God remains ignorant of some things. The point about 
composing and dividing seems to leave the problem in exactly the same place. 
But we can see the relevance of Thomas' suggestion that God does not 
know by composing and dividing if we take into account an important point 
made in the preceding article. There the question is whether God knows 
statable facts (enuntiabilia). Thomas reasons that since the power to form the 
statement of facts lies within the human mind, and since God knows whatever 
is in the power of his creatures, God knows all the statements of fact that can 
be formed. But since the divine mind, unlike the human mind, has no need 
to unify in a statement an understanding of reality taken in bit by bit, (unum 
redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando) , 
it does not understand statable facts by forming statements of them (scit 
enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium).J4 
The important thing to note for our present purposes is that to say the divine 
mind does not compose or divide is thus to say something not only about the 
way the divine mind acts but also about the way reality is presented to the 
divine mind-the object of the act. In a more contemporary idiom, we may 
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say that God's knowledge is nonpropositional, i.e., God does not form prop-
ositions to understand the world. And if God knows everything without form-
ing propositions, then there is something wrong with the challenge to state 
in propositional form just what God represents to himself of temporal events. 
With his customary terseness, Thomas is thus proposing a remarkable solution 
to the Argument from Omniscience. God knows all that we know about temporal 
events, but in a way that we cannot adequately represent to ourselves. 
Of course so extraordinary a claim has its difficulties, and we will shortly 
consider some of them. This much, however, is already clear: the Argument 
from Omniscience neglects an alternative. 
The contradictory of God knows occurrences through indexical proposi-
tions is not God knows occurrences through non indexical propositions. The 
contradictory is that It is not the case that God knows occurrences through 
indexical propositions. The right way to set out the alternatives is this: Either 
God knows propositionally or not. If the former, then he knows either by 
indexical propositions or nonindexical propositions. Opponents of the tradi-
tional view have routinely overlooked the first division-propositional/non-
propositional-passing on immediately to the second. There thus remains the 
neglected possibility that God knows the world in a way we cannot adequately 
represent in any proposition. 
To refute the traditional position one must block Aquinas' way out. This 
few attempt. IS 
5. An Objection: The Common View of Nonpropositional Knowledge 
Perhaps some will say that the reason few attempt a refutation is because 
it is unclear just what this putative nonpropositional knowledge is supposed 
to be. Of course, we are familiar with non propositional knowledge in the 
form of sensation-tasting an orange-but surely this is not what Aquinas 
has in mind. Thomas is referring to intellectual knowledge, knowledge that 
penetrates beneath the observable surface of things to get at the things them-
selves. But how is the mind to see things as they are without forming prop-
ositions? 
Our understanding of Aquinas' point is apt to be very much conditioned 
by the common conception of nondiscursive knowledge. As Richard Sorabji 
observes, 
It is commonly held that non-discursive thinking does not involve thinking 
that something is the case. Instead it contemplates concepts in isolation from 
each other, and does not string them together in the way they are strung 
together in 'that' -clauses}6 
On this account of the matter, nondiscursive thinking is a kind of subjudgmen-
tal exercise of intelligence indistinguishable from interrupted thought. You 
start to think that beauty is truth, but get only to beauty when the number 68 
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bus knocks you unconsciousP Nondiscursive knowledge is fragmentary 
knowledge. By moving from concept to concept the mind grasps a state of 
affairs, the fact that something is the case. Such a movement presupposes 
lesser acts, none of which by itself attains an understanding of the way things 
are. These lesser components are acts of nondiscursive understanding. 
Construing non propositional thinking this way makes sense of the notion, 
but it scarcely provides a defense for the traditional view of God's knowl-
edge. Instead of an exalted mode of cognition, nonpropositional knowledge 
turns out to be all too human half-thought. Limited to subjudgmental knowl-
edge, God would be anything but omniscient. He would grasp no truth what-
ever. Thus the traditional view again seems to lapse into incoherence. 
6. The Assumption Behind The Common View 
of Nonpropositional Knowledge 
Now Sorabji may well be right. Maybe the common view is that if a thought 
is nonpropositional, then it must be mere contemplation of isolated concepts. 
For this is the way we know the way things are. We string concepts together. 
And so it is natural for us to assume that simple thought is necessarily 
incomplete thought. 
This, however, is only a natural assumption. It does not follow from x does 
not know y by stringing concepts together that x does not know y. This is just 
a special case of the invalid argument form: If x does y by z-ing, then if x 
does not do y by z-ing, then x does not do y. If you can read by moving your 
lips, it hardly follows that you cannot read without moving your lips. Of 
course, if by definition reading involves lip movement, as people might have 
thought in the early days of reading when silent reading was unknown, then 
those who fail to move their lips would fail to read. And if by definition, to 
know the truth of things is to string concepts together, it would then follow 
that if a thinker did not string them together, the truth would not be attained. 
But why should we assume that our way is the only way intellectually to 
grasp a complex reality? 
Thomas made no such assumption. In fact, he assumed the opposite. Our way 
of knowing is accidental to knowing. IS It is a grave error to assimilate the divine 
to the human mode of knowing. 19 The first step towards understanding the 
classical view, at least as expounded by St. Thomas, is to set aside an idea of 
nonpropositional thought as interrupted propositional thought. 
But what, then, did Aquinas have in mind? Rather than sink the discussion 
in exegesis, let's see what we can make of matters in our own terms. 
7. An Uncommon Understanding of Nonpropositional Knowledge 
For this purpose, it will be useful to introduce the expressions: "Occur-
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rence," "Intellectual Act," "Cognitive Display," "Mode of Intellectual Act," 
and "Mode of Cognitive Display." 
7.1. Preliminaries: Occurrence, Intellectual Act, Cognitive Display, 
Mode of Intellectual Act, and Mode of Cognitive Display 
Occurrence. Let us refer to anything that happens within the space-time 
system of things as an "occurrence."20 A bird landing on a branch, a clock's 
hand sweeping past a number on its face, and a child breaking into a smile 
are all occurrences. So too are more static realities, e.g., the statue staying 
fixed in its place over time, and remaining, for however long, self-identical. 
Intellectual Act. To know an occurrence a mind must do something to make 
cognitive contact with it. Let us call this the intellectual act. A nonoccurrence 
may also be the object of an intellectual act. Since, however, our present 
problem concerns occurrences, we may confine our attention to intellectual 
acts bearing on occurrences. 
Cognitive Display. When by an intellectual act the mind makes contact 
with an occurrence, we may say it displays the occurrence. The occurrence, 
then, picks up the attribute of being cognitively displayed.21 
Here it is important to note two things. 
First, "cognitive display" is not a substitute for "proposition. "22 The whole 
point of introducing the concept of a cognitive display is to open the possi-
bility of discussing nonpropositional modes of apprehending truth about re-
ality. A "cognitive display" is a showing of an occurrence to a mind, whatever 
the mode of display. "Propositional knowledge," by contrast, indicates a 
particular mode of display. We shall return to this point in a moment. 
Second, "cognitive display" does not refer to an ontological medium be-
tween the action of the mind and the occurrence in the world. It mayor may 
not be necessary for a mind to form a medium to display the object. But by 
"cognitive display" I mean the object displayed, not the medium of the dis-
play. In other words, if in order to display an occurrence it were necessary 
to display it on a mental mirror, "cognitive display" would name the occur-
rence, not the mirror. A cognitive display of an occurrence is just the occur-
rence qua known. 
Mode of Intellectual Act. The mind acts to display an occurrence in various 
ways and with various levels of success. One act may display an occurrence 
with less penetration than another, or in less detail. Smith knows the light 
passing through the diamond somehow makes it bright; Jones knows the same 
in terms of diamond's index of refraction. One intellectual act may display 
an occurrence in isolation, while a second relates the occurrence to something 
else. Smith knows an effigy of the Devil peeking from a huge boot was 
discovered hanging from a Liberty Tree; Jones knows it to be in dishonor of 
Lord Bute. 
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In these cases the mode differs because the content is richer or poorer. But 
that's not necessary for the mode to vary. Thinking that 21 has the prime 
factors of 7 and 3 differs modally from thinking that 3 and 7 are the prime 
factors of 21. The truth conditions are the same, but the intentional structures 
of the act differ inasmuch as in one case the composite is taken first, in the 
other the factors. 
It would be difficult to define "mode of intellectual act." Fortunately, 
however, what we need for our purposes is only the assurance that intellectual 
acts can vary in mode even when displaying the same occurrence. The ex-
amples provide that assurance. 
Mode of Cognitive Display. We may now say that two displays differ in 
mode if the corresponding intellectual acts differ in any of the ways just 
depicted or in any other way. 
These noetic terms are meant neutrally, applying to divine knowledge as 
well as human. Nevertheless, in order to try to state more accurately a theory 
of nonpropositional knowledge that is free of the drawbacks of Sorabji's 
"common" view of the matter, we need to take human knowledge as a point 
of departure. 
7.2. The Human Mode of Knowing 
Propositional knowledge is a particular mode of displaying an occurrence 
through an intentional referent and an abstract attribute (a property or rela-
tion). An abstract attribute is an attribute grasped abstractly. To grasp an 
attribute abstractly is to separate the attribute from its real and possible 
exemplifications. Things of this world, the referents of our cognitive displays, 
exemplify abstract attributes, but do not possess abstract attributes. The 
Black-capped Chickadee perching on a twig has no abstract attributes. 
There's nothing abstract about her little black cap and bib, ragged over the 
lower edge. She does not perch on an abstraction, nor does she perch ab-
stractly. For there are no abstract twigs to perch on, nor is there any way to 
perch abstractly. But we abstractly display the perching Chickadee through 
concepts marshalled to form propositions. We cannot have propositional 
knowledge about a thing of which we have no concept whatever. 23 
There is yet another feature of propositional knowledge pertinent to our 
discussion. As Russell once expressed it, our knowledge of things seems to 
"radiate out" from these objects at the center of our attention. 24 We express 
what we know of singular temporal events in relationship to the time of our 
representations or utterances. 
At least this is true of the passage of full blooded time, if not of what some 
have called "bare temporality,"25 the mere sequential ordering of: earlier/si-
multaneous with/later. To grasp more than bare temporality, we must realize 
the present temporal stage of the universe, as present, and other stages in 
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relation to it. We grasp the present from within the series of temporal occa-
sions and represent it with temporal indexicals. 
7.3. The Divine Mode of Knowing 
Human knowledge reflects the mind's need to compose and divide, and in 
the case of knowledge of the present as present, it connects the intentional 
subject with the attribute in a manner that indicates the temporal position of 
the knower. Why must God display such knowledge in any other way? 
Aquinas argues in several ways that the structure of God's knowledge is 
nonpropositional. His deepest reason is that God is utterly simple,26 a doctrine 
that for some is "a lot to swallow."27 But Thomas also argues without relying 
on the doctrine of simplicity, taking as his point of departure the perfection 
of the Creator's knowledge. 
The Creator knows everything insofar as his causality extends to it. His 
penetrating knowledge extends to the very individuality of things as causally 
sustained by his acts. If any analogy with a movie is to be made, it is that 
the movie is the story God tells. The creation does not exist prior to God's 
knowledge of it; the Creator does not wait to see what he creates. By contrast 
our knowledge of things is dependent upon a cognitive apparatus that grasps 
things through universals, incompletely. The one who knows a thing by 
having a universal concept of it does not know that thing in itself. "To know 
Socrates through this, that he is white or the son of Sophroniscus, or to know 
him through some other universal (quidquid aliud), is not to know him as 
this man."28 But the "active power of God extends itself not only to the forms, 
from which universal notions derive, but even to matter ... and singulars."29 
By one intellectual act the divine mind attains intimate epistemic acquaint-
ance with every concrete occurrence. God knows the whole of it, in all of its 
individuality. He displays occurrences to himselfthrough a single intellectual 
act, without relying on impoverished abstraction, and since he is beyond 
space and time, without temporal self-reference. 
The more perfect a being, Aquinas argues, the more perfect its mode of 
knowing; the more perfect the mode the simpler. As internal sense powers grasp, 
in a single act, complexes that external sense grasps separately or not at all, 
so the divine mind grasps intellectually all that our composing and dividing 
mind grasps through complex operations. As God knows the changeable un-
changeably, and the material immaterially, he knows the composite simply.30 
Just how God displays to himself nonpropositionally the fact we display as 
The Chickadee is (now) perching on the twig we cannot say. Gone are the 
abstractions through which we access and display the intentional subject and 
predicate. God has no need of these. Gone too is the peculiar indexical mode 
of connecting intentional subject and predicate, for gone too are intentional 
subjects and attributes. As a race of blind beings that perceived extension 
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only by synthesizing multiple touch sensations would find it difficult to 
understand descriptions of another mode of perception that took in extension 
all at once and without proprioceptive sensation,3) so we are mystified by the 
description of knowledge that grasps temporal occurrences without synthe-
sizing concepts and without temporal self-reference. But from the fact that 
we find it difficult to imagine such knowledge, nothing whatever follows 
about its possibility. 
The mode of existence of a thing does not determine the mode of knowing 
it.32 In general it is not the case that for x to know y, which has characteristic 
z, x's noetic act must have characteristic z. A yellow object may be sensed 
without the sensation being yellow. Our way of knowing is accidental to 
knowing. No a priori reason precludes an intelligence from knowing a tem-
poral occurrence atemporally. 
8. Returning to the Problem 
I have stated, largely in my own terms, what I take Aquinas' view of 
nonpropositional knowledge to be, and I have given some of the grounds for 
thinking God enjoys such knowledge. Whether it is Aquinas' position or not, 
the idea of nonpropositional knowledge spelled out here is far removed from 
the common view of nonpropositional knowledge as "interrupted thought." 
God does not string concepts together, but he displays everything to his mind 
according to a mode above our own. 
This isn't to say that we cannot affirmatively answer questions of the form 
"Does God know it is now ?" It is just that we have to qualify the 
answer. God knows what we know by thinking it is now , but he 
knows it "purely," without the intrusion of incidental elements peculiar to 
our limited way of knowing. Our way is just one way to know the present as 
present, peculiar to an intelligence that takes its knowledge from things. And 
it is not God's. 
It follows that we cannot adequately state in propositional form God's 
knowledge of the present as present. Adequate representation of God's 
knowledge as he represents it to himself requires more than representing the 
same facts. It requires representing them in the same way. This we cannot do 
since God's way of displaying occurrences couldn't be more alien to our own. 
In reply to the Argument from Omniscience, it is thus open to a defender 
of God's immutability to deny (4), that a being that always knows what time 
it is is subject to change. It is true that (3) a being who knows everything 
always knows what time it is. But it is true only in the sense that (3b) 
throughout all its (timeless) existence, the being knows what time it is quoad 
nos, i.e., what time it is for those whose existence is temporal. And though we 
cannot meet the challenge to state adequately a proposition that expresses from 
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the eternal point of view what it is that God knows, the challenge rests upon 
the faulty presupposition that God displays his knowledge propositionally. 
9. Conclusion 
This reply to the Argument from Omniscience-or better, beginning of a 
reply33-is of course open to objections. How could it be otherwise when we 
are speaking of a way of knowing so much superior to our own? My main 
purpose, however, has simply been to bring attention to a neglected way out 
of the dilemma. Perhaps it will be helpful to conclude with a few remarks 
directed to possible misunderstandings. 
First, to say God knows nonpropositionally is not to say that God is ignorant 
of propositions. These too he knows-nonpropositionally.34 Something G. E. 
Moore says can serve to clarify this point. "Surely everybody can see that 
the fact that a lion does exist is quite a different sort of entity from the lion 
himself."3s Instead of saying with Moore that there are two facts here, we 
may simply say that an existing lion may be displayed in the thought that a 
lion does exist. The human mind spreads the existing lion into the fact that 
the lion exists. The non propositional knower grasps the existing lion, the 
beast itself, without refraction. And without refraction, he knows our mind 
bends the light from every reality towards its own temporal locus. 
Second, I do not mean, nor do I think Aquinas means, that the difference 
between the human and divine mode of knowing is that God knows things 
directly, while we must know them through an ontological medium, a prop-
osition, dwelling in some queer limbo between mental acts and things.36 
Consider a parallel. If it were to be claimed that some unearthly being could 
see the whole moon, inside and outside, all at once, while we of course can 
see only aspects of it, we should not immediately infer that we see something 
distinct from the moon called Aspects, while the unearthly being saw the 
moon itself. One might want to say that human knowledge of the world is 
through an ontological medium; but that position is independent of the one 
developed here. 
Third, I do not mean to assert or to suggest that the world is in itself an 
undifferentiated whole, that discriminations are the mere product of mind. 
The bird and its perching, for example, are distinct realities. It is not that they 
are distinct only for the human mind. But only the human mind is obliged to 
grasp the bird's perching here and now by forming an abstract idea of it. 
Last, with specific reference to time, I am not saying that time is unreal or 
only a human construct, as if there is no temporal reality for God to know. 
There is, and he knows it, but not in a way that requires temporal self-refer-
ence. The claim seems paradoxical because of our automatic assumption that 
to know is to know in a human way. Thus we are apt to reason: 
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But, of course, presentness cries out for a recipient, to be present is to be 
present to someone ... The very concept of the now-of-the-present is thus 
inseparably linked with a conscious experience, the experience of a being 
who, from a position of placement within the framework of temporality 
assumes with conscious awareness that temporal perspective through which 
alone the A-series distinction of past/present/future [McTaggart's] can come 
into operation.37 
33 
It's this sailing from knowledge of the present requiring conscious experience 
to requiring conscious experience within the framework of temporality, so 
natural to us, that Aquinas bids us to resist. 
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